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Revenge, Punishment, and Justice in Athenian Homicide Law 
 
D. L. Cairns 
 
This chapter forms part of a larger study of emotions of esteem and self-esteem in 
classical (fifth- and fourth-century) Athenian society. An element of that project  
focuses on the role of timê (conventionally ‘honour’, but encompassing notions of 
worth, dignity, prestige, and deference) in Athenian law.  This, in turn, requires a 
consideration of recent controversies regarding the relative importance of personal 
vengeance versus the punishment of offenders in Athenian litigation. The current 
chapter is an attempt at a test-case of manageable scope, using a limited range of 
primary sources. The aim is to focus on a limited body of evidence, namely the small 
corpus of extant Athenian forensic speeches that deal with homicide, to see what, if 
anything, is distinctive about homicide trials in terms of the role that they assign to 
notions of honour, vengeance, and state-regulated punishment. An important part of 
this will concern the relation between the affective and the normative in such contexts. 
 
It is useful to focus on limited corpus of homicide speeches because it is important to 
respect whatever differences there may be between (a) different categories of offence, 
(b) prosecution speeches on the one hand and defence speeches on the other, and (c) 
the various procedures by which homicide could be prosecuted in Athenian law. Even 
before that, however, it is important to notice how limited the evidence is. We have 
six speeches written for delivery in trials dealing with homicide. Three of these are for 
delivery in the courts that dealt specifically with such cases. These are: Antiphon 1 (a 
prosecution speech in a case of alleged bouleusis phonou hekousiou (planning of 
intentional homicide), and thus probably delivered before the Areopagus;1 Antiphon 6 
(a defence speech on a charge of planning involuntary homicide, bouleusis phonou 
akousiou, hence heard by the Palladion); and Lysias 1 (a case in which the defendant 
alleges that he committed lawful homicide, and brought before the Delphinion). 
Besides these, there are two speeches in cases in which accused has been subjected to 
arrest, imprisonment, and trial (apagogê). These are Antiphon 5 (for the defence) and 
Lysias 13 (for the prosecution). The latter appears to be a legitimate use of apagogê 
for homicide, while the former (as the speaker alleges himself) may be a misuse of the 
procedure for apagogê or endeixis for kakourgoi (‘malefactors’). Apart from these 
five speeches, we also have Lysias 12, in which Lysias asks a jury to condemn 
Eratosthenes for the killing of his brother, Polemarchus. This is not a regular 
homicide prosecution, but a case brought against Eratosthenes in the context of the 
euthynai (scrutiny) that he underwent as a former member of the Thirty (the 
oligarchic regime that took power in Athens following her defeat in the 
Peloponnesian War), in order to be covered by the amnesty of 403 which permitted 
members of the regime to remain in Athens only if they underwent such scrutiny of 
their conduct. There are two further cases of wounding with intent (trauma ek 
pronoias), which is the Athenian equivalent of attempted homicide (Lysias 3 and 4, 
                                                
1 The Areopagus, a court consisting of former archons, heard all cases of phonos hekousios. [Arist.] Ath. 
Pol. 57. 3 indicates that another court heard cases of involuntary homicide (phonos akousios), adding 
‘and also cases of bouleusis’. MacDowell (1963: 64-9) takes this to mean that all cases of bouleusis 
were heard at the Palladion, though the more usual view (e.g. of  Lipsius and Wilamowitz, cited by 
MacDowell loc. cit.) is that Ath. Pol. is referring only to bouleusis phonou akousiou (planning of 
involuntary homicide, i.e. the planning of acts that led unintentionally to the victim’s death, as in 
Antiphon 6). 
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both for the defence); these would have been heard by the Areopagus. 
 
Other cases of homicide are of course referred to, in the orators and elsewhere. G. 
Herman  counts 16 attested cases (excluding ‘political’ murders) for the years 507-
322. For Herman, this shows that homicide was rare,2 and supports his overall 
contention that democratic Athens was, by comparison with other pre-modern 
societies, unusually non-violent. But we need to put these figures in context: there are 
many offences in Athenian law (attested in ancient sources and much-discussed in 
modern scholarship) for which there is no securely attested case at all;3 and the figure 
of three speeches for the special homicide courts and six overall for alleged instances 
of unlawful killing, needs to be set beside the total number of surviving court 
speeches from the same period. Scholars differ slightly on that total (for various 
reasons), but all inventories list around 100 cases. A figure of 5% or 6% as a ration of 
homicide cases to all attested cases is not particularly low. The figures for homicide 
as a percentage of all recorded offences in Scotland in 2009/10 are as low as 0.02%. 
My point is not that we have here the Athenian homicide rate, but that we cannot 
make these comparisons. The numbers yielded by the surviving evidence for classical 
Athens, both for all crime and for homicide, are too small to be statistically 
significant; and yet, for whatever reason, homicide speeches are a significant 
proportion of our (very limited) surviving corpus of forensic oratory. 
 
A case in one of the special homicide courts would normally (and perhaps could only) 
be initiated by a member of the victim’s family. A case resulting from apagogê could 
be brought by anyone. But no case could be initiated at all if the victim forgave the 
killer at the point of death.4 For MacDowell ‘this rule about absolution … proves 
beyond question that vengeance required by the killed person was one of the 
principles on which [Athenian homicide] law was founded’.5 In a way, I think this is 
right, though I will want to qualify it in some respects below. But for the moment, let 
us not beg the question, and substitute ‘redress’ for ‘vengeance’. The pursuit of the 
redress that the deceased demanded was a duty of that person’s male relatives;6 and in 
fact it seems that all our extant cases, even those which could in theory have been 
initiated by any citizen who wished to proceed, have been initiated by kin. Whereas 
for us homicide is perhaps paradigmatically a crime, in which the onus is on the state 
to find and punish an offender, at Athens it is fundamentally an offence against the 
victim and his or her family. 
 
This primary orientation is apparent in several other respects. In two ways, the 
demands of the victim’s family for emotional satisfaction are encompassed in the 
extent and circumstances of the penalty. First, the prosecutor had the right to be 
present to witness the execution.7 An execution, however, would actually take place 
only in the event that the defendant did not exercise his prerogative to flee after 
                                                
2 Herman (2006) 207. Cf. Lanni (2006) 75, 112. 
3 See the list of all attested offences and cases in Todd (1993) 102-9. 
4 For this (i.e. the possibility of aphesis), see D. 37. 59: ‘if the victim himself before his death releases 
the murderer from bloodguiltiness, it is not lawful for any of the remaining kinsmen to prosecute’. Cf. 
E. Hipp. 1442-3, 1448-51 (with MacDowell (1968)). 
5 MacDowell (1963) 148. 
6 MacDowell (1963) 8-11. 
7 See D. 23. 69 (cf. Aeschin. 2. 181-2). Execution (by apotympanismos, being fastened to a board) was 
possibly public: see Todd (2000) 47-8. That executions for homicide were probably rare is the view of 
Carawan (1998) 149. 
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delivering his first speech. There is no certainly attested instance; and the event was 
probably relatively rare. The family’s interest in the extent of the penalty is also 
recognized by the institution of aidesis, the process by which the relatives of a victim 
of unintentional homicide could, if they were so persuaded, allow an exiled killer to 
return to Attica.8 Aidesis implies that the victim’s family might retain residual or even 
considerable resentment, not necessarily dispelled by conviction or even by a period 
of exile, even when a court has established the absence of intention to kill. The 
provision no doubt derives from a period at which homicide was exclusively a matter 
for the families concerned to resolve; the term’s derivation (from aideomai, I respect) 
indicates the importance accorded the emotional attitudes of the victim’s family. 
Aidesis seems to require some sort of approach by the exiled homicide, an act of 
persuasion or supplication designed to elicit a change in attitude. This may have been 
purely formal, and it may have involved the payment of compensation, but still the 
provision demonstrates the orientation of Athenian homicide law towards the victim, 
the victim’s family, and their sense of grievance.9 
 
If a relative decided to proceed with a case in one of the special homicide courts (a 
dikê phonou), he would, after making an application to the relevant magistrate (the 
basileus), have to attend three preliminary hearings (prodikasiai), a month apart, 
before the case came to court in the fourth month. We do not know anything about 
what took place at these hearings, but some  speculate that one purpose was to allow a 
settlement if one could be reached.10 The speaker of Demosthenes 58. 28-9 presents it 
as disreputable to accept a financial settlement rather than proceed with a suit for 
phonos hekousios,11 but it does not seem to have been illegal to do so. Settlement 
before trial is a regular option in a wide range of Athenian legal proceedings. 
Accordingly, a relative who did proceed to trial after three prodikasiai is rejecting any 
suggestion of a private settlement and insisting on the redress that the victim is felt to 
demand.12 
 
That redress, however, can be obtained only by means of the institutions of the polis. 
The state left much in the hands of individuals and families, and took considerable 
account of their interests and motives, but the relevant procedures are subject to state 
regulation from start to finish in ways that extensively limit or exclude forms of 
redress that probably obtained prior to the development of legislation and to which 
families might otherwise be tempted.13 The state’s interest in limiting self-help and 
                                                
8 See Dracon’s homicide law, IG 1.3 104. 13-19; cf. D. 21. 43; 23. 72, 77; 37. 58-9; 38. 21-2; Ath. Pol. 
57. 3. See further Heitsch (1984); cf. MacDowell (1963) 123-5; Gagarin (1981) 48-52, 139-40. For 
Gagarin, the restriction to cases of phonos akousios did not apply in Dracon’s original law; cf. Carawan 
(1998) 33-83 (esp. 34-6, 81), 151; but contrast Heitsch (1984) 12-18. 
9 Cf. MacDowell (1963) 123. 
10 See e.g. Carawan (1998) 142. 
11 D. 58. 28: ‘Not long after he was removed from office, when his brother died by a violent death, 
Theocrines showed himself so utterly heartless toward him that, when he had made inquiry concerning 
those who had done the deed, and had learned who they were, he accepted money, and let the matter 
drop.’ 
12 Cf. Carawan (1998) 112, 272. 
13 For the various aspects of state control, see already Dracon’s homicide law, esp. the protection it 
afforded a killer who chose exile, 26-9. Cf. D. 23. 37-43, 51-2 (the exiled killer is not to be pursued or 
killed, though he may be killed with impunity or arrested if he breaks exile, 28-35); 44-6, 49 
(protection for those exiled for unintentional homicide); 69 (the prosecutor can witness the execution of 
a relative’s killer, but punishment, kolasis, is carried out by the city in the name of its laws); 71-3 (only 
the law has authority over someone convicted for unintentional homicide; the exile is to leave by a 
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controlling violence, especially cycles of violent retaliation, is clear already in 
Dracon’s homicide law and explicitly commended in Demosthenes’ extensive paean 
to Athenian homicide law in his speech (number 23 in the corpus) against 
Aristocrates: as we have seen, the prosecutor can witness the execution of a relative’s 
killer, but the action is performed by the city in the name of its laws (D. 23. 69). 
Someone accused of homicide must keep away from certain parts of the city, but may 
otherwise go about his business. A defendant on a charge of phonos hekousios (and so 
liable to the death penalty if convicted) may withdraw into exile at any point up to the 
end of the first defence speech, and may not be hindered or pursued. Anyone exiled 
for phonos akousios must be allowed safe passage out of the country. An exiled killer 
may be put to death or arrested if he returns to Attica, but he may not be pursued or 
killed beyond the borders, and if arrested, he may not be subject to torture or extortion. 
The bottom line may be the victim’s desire for redress, enjoined as a duty on his 
relatives, but the city has a major say in how that redress is pursued. If the importance 
accorded the grievances of the victim and the family suggests the pursuit of 
something like vengeance, the role of the state in regulating the whole process shows 
that this is not just a matter of personal revenge; at the least it is regulated and 
sanctioned by the state; but there is also a sense in which it reflects the state’s 
legitimate interest in the rule of law and the punishment of offenders. With 
Demosthenes’ claim that the intention behind Dracon’s law was ‘to prevent an 
endless succession of timôriai’, we might compare the pride in Athenian institutions’ 
ability to do just that that is evident in Aeschylus’ Eumenides. 
 
We shall come back in a moment to what it is that individuals, their families, and the 
polis might be said to want from the legal process: it may be too simple to oppose the 
family, with its presumed desire for revenge, to the state with its interest in 
punishment. But first I want to look at two areas in which issues of revenge or 
retaliation bear on homicide procedures in slightly different ways. 
 
First, one of the issues in the now rather tired dispute between Herman and his 
opponents (such as D. Cohen) on the prevalence of feuding, enmity, and revenge in 
Athenian society concerns the pursuit of enmity in cycles of litigation. For Cohen, 
these represent the pursuit of vendetta by other means – the norms here are norms of 
masculinity, honour, and emotions such as anger, not of justice or the rule of law.14 
For Herman, such cases are isolated abuses that do not detract either from legal 
system’s general aim of resolving and preventing disputes or from the general picture 
of Athenian society as peaceful, tolerant, and non-confrontational. The latter position 
is not really tenable. Prosecutors often admit their personal hostility towards the 
accused;15 and this is especially the case in graphai, ‘public’ cases that could be 
brought by any citizen, where it is important to have a personal motive in order to 
                                                                                                                                      
specified route and must be allowed safe passage; he may appeal for aidesis and return); 80 
(regulations specifying limits on the prosecutor’s actions and a degree of protection for those 
prosecuted by apagogê). According to Demosthenes, the general principle of Athenian homicide law is 
‘to prevent an endless succession of timôriai’ (ἵνα μὴ … ἀπέραντοι τῶν ἀτυχημάτων αἱ τιμωρίαι 
γίγνωνται, 23. 39). Cf. (e.g.) Cohen (2005) 227-8. 
14 See Cohen (1995), passim. 
15 See e.g. Aeschin. 1. 2 (‘very often private enmities correct public abuses’); [D.] 53. 2 (‘I thought it 
the most outrageous thing ever seen among men, that I should myself suffer the wrong, but that another 
should lend his name on behalf of me, the one wronged; and that this would then serve as presumptive 
proof to my adversaries that I am lying whenever I speak to you of our enmity’); further examples in 
Dover (1974) 182; Cohen (1995) 61-86; Rhodes (1998). 
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forestall charges of vexatious litigation, or ‘sycophancy’.  There are, moreover, many 
speeches that demonstrate that the litigants in the particular case are engaged in a 
protracted, personally or politically motivated cycle of suit and counter-suit. A good 
example is Lysias 10 (Against Theomnestus 1), where there have been at least four 
previous suits involving speaker, his adversary, and their allies;16 as S. Todd puts it ‘a 
lot of what occurs in the orators is not so much dispute settlement as dispute 
perpetuation’.17 It is significant (of course) that this retaliation is pursued by legal and 
peaceful means, but the instances in which a particular suit is clearly just one stage in 
an ongoing dispute are too numerous to be regarded as isolated abuses of the system 
and must reflect a wider culture of retaliation in Athenian society. 
 
On occasion, however, it might be in the interests of defendants to suggest that their 
opponents are engaged in the pursuit of a wider, personally or politically motivated 
agenda. This is not just an argument that the pursuit of enmity through the courts is an 
abuse of the system; it is also – and more importantly – a tactic to undermine the 
prosecution’s case in the trial in question, especially in a homicide case, given the 
Athenians’ sense that homicide trials required a higher level of seriousness, relevance, 
and focus on the facts of the case, than did other kinds of suit.18 This is the aim of the 
chorêgos, the defendant in Antiphon 6, who claims that the relatives of the chorister 
whose death he is accused of causing were suborned to prosecute him by his political 
enemies, whom he had previously charged with misconduct in public office.19 We see 
something similar in Isocrates 18 and Demosthenes (in fact Apollodorus) 59,20 neither 
of which is a homicide case, but both of which refer to trials in which the speaker’s 
opponent has brought false charges of homicide as a tactic in an ongoing dispute: in 
Isocrates 18 the falsity of the charge is irrefutably demonstrated by the accused’s 
ability to produce the alleged victim before the court. It could not have been 
unthinkable for individuals opportunistically to subvert the processes of the homicide 
courts in this way, though given the respect in which these courts were held, it is 
clearly part of the speaker’s purpose to present his opponents’ motives as negatively 
as he can. Homicide trials are clearly enmeshed in the general rough and tumble of 
Athenian life, and part of that was the use of the lawcourts as a vehicle for personal 
and political feuds. But the fact that a homicide trial, like any other sort of case, may 
be used in pursuit of purely personal vengeance does not in any way prove that the 
intrinsic purpose of a homicide trial was nothing more than personal vengeance. 
 
The second issue is the extent to which Athenian law legitimized killing in retaliation. 
There were some forms of killing that were specified as lawful: these would either not 
lead to a trial at all, if the relatives of the victim agreed that there was no case to 
answer; or, if the relatives rejected the killer’s justification, the defendant might be 
acquitted without penalty if he successfully argued (at the Delphinion) that one of 
these scenarios applied in his case.21 One of these circumstances is the one that 
                                                
16 On Lysias 10, see Todd (1993) 258-9; cf. e.g. the ongoing feud between Demosthenes and Meidias, 
MacDowell (1990) 1-13; Cohen (1995) 87-118. 
17 Todd (1993) 153. 
18 See MacDowell (1963) 42-4, 100; Lanni (2006) 75-114. 
19 See Antiphon 6. 34-6, 39-40. 
20 See Isoc. 18. 52-4 (in context of a property dispute, Callimachus charges Cratinus with killing a slave 
woman; Cratinus produces the ‘deceased’, alive and kicking, at his trial); [D.] (i.e. Apollodorus) 59. 9-
10 (Stephanus has allegedly been bribed by Apollodorus’ enemies to accuse him of involuntary 
homicide of slave woman). 
21 See D. 23. 53. 
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obtains in Lysias 1, killing of a seducer caught in flagrante.22 The same law that 
specifies the legality of this action also specifies one form of killing in self-defence, 
killing of a highway robber (Demosthenes 23. 53). Later in the same speech 
Demosthenes quotes Draco’s law for the right to kill someone attempting to seize 
oneself (and/or one’s property) illegally and by force.23 This provision is attested also 
in the inscribed text of the law itself; and the immediately preceding lines of the 
inscription have two tantalizing references to ‘beginning unjust hands’, a phrase used 
in the context of a plea of justified retaliation at Antiphon 4. 2. 1 (cf. 4. 3. 2-4). There 
is disagreement about whether all forms of killing in self-defence could be argued to 
fall under the same category. Gagarin (1978) argues for a distinction between lawful 
killing and killing in what he calls ‘simple self-defence’. This seems to be borne out 
by (a) Antiphon’s third Tetralogy and (b) a passage in Demosthenes 21 (Against 
Meidias), where the issue appears to be not affirmation versus denial of self-defence, 
but whether self-defence, even if established, should acquit.  
 
Leaving aside the complications raised by Antiphon’s Tetralogies (artificial rhetorical 
exercises, heavily reliant on arguments from probablity), let us look at the case 
mentioned in Demosthenes 21. In sections 70-6 of the speech, Demosthenes contrasts 
his own forbearance when punched in the face in public with the violent reactions of 
two other men, one of whom is Euaeon, who killed a man called Boeotus in 
retaliation for a single blow. For Herman the point of this passage is simple: 
Demosthenes wants to elicit the jurors’ admiration for his refusal to retaliate violently 
and their support for his principled stance in seeking legal redress; the case of Euaeon 
and Boeotus is there to provide a negative example.24 But Demosthenes’ argument is 
designed to pre-empt the conclusion that the offence for which he is seeking redress 
must be an insignificant one – otherwise, he’d have hit back (70). Euaeon’s lethal 
retaliation against Boeotus is then introduced in order to illustrate how unbearable an 
insult can be (71-2). Demosthenes then (73) urges his audience to reflect that, if 
Euaeon’s anger was understandable, his against Meidias is more so. He was fortunate 
and sensible enough to be able to restrain himself in the face of this extreme 
provocation, and though he represents his own response as the correct one, he also 
understands Euaeon’s – and so did many of the jurors at Euaeon’s trial, given that he 
was condemned by only one vote (74-5). Demosthenes wants to present Meidias’ 
offence as worse than that of Boeotus and his own prudence and self-control as better 
and more admirable than Euaeon’s violent retaliation. But he and Euaeon share the 
same desire for satisfaction, for restitution of timê – for timôria (75-6). Demosthenes 
wants to persuade the jurors that his anger is as great as or greater than Euaeon’s, to 
arouse their anger at Meidias, and to persuade them that his failure to retaliate at the 
time is not a sign of any lack of gravity either in the offence or in his reaction to it. 
Demosthenes has it both ways: he wants to advertise his own forbearance, but also to 
appropriate the sense of outrage that drove Euaeon to kill. He possesses the manly 
desire to retaliate that was endorsed by the minority of dikasts who voted to acquit; 
but has also demonstrated his strength in overcoming a powerful opponent – not 
Meidias, but his own anger. The distribution of the votes for the condemnation or 
acquittal of Euaeon and Demosthenes’ argument in general indicate not that Athenian 
                                                
22 See Lys. 1. 30-1, with the law quoted at D. 23. 53 (‘in intercourse with his wife, or mother, or sister, 
or daughter, or concubine kept for procreation of legitimate children’); also Ath. Pol. 57. 3; Aeschin. 1. 
91; Plu. Sol. 23. 1. 
23 D. 23. 60; cf. the law itself, IG 1.3 104. 37-8. 
24 See Herman (2006) 168-73, 403. 
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attitudes to revenge are simple, but that they are complex. The fact that Euaeon was 
actually condemned, and his plea of self-defence did not persuade even some who 
accepted it to vote for acquittal, suggests that Gagarin is right that such cases do not 
fall into the same legal category as the various forms of lawful killing.  
 
Someone who ‘began unjust hands’ would be liable for prosecution in Athenian law, 
for the offence of aikeia (assault; thus such a person would be a lawbreaker); but the 
law seems not to authorize lethal retaliation in this case. It does, however, authorize 
lethal retaliation when a man catches another ‘in intercourse with his wife, or mother, 
or sister, or daughter, or concubine kept for the procreation of legitimate children’ 
(Demosthenes 23. 53). This is the law that Euphiletus appeals to in his defence 
against the charge that he unlawfully killed the seducer, Eratosthenes, in Lysias 1 (see 
esp. 1. 30-1). The facts of the case may not be as the speaker represents them; and 
even if they are, there is clear exaggeration in his insistence that the law commands, 
rather than permits him to kill a seducer (26, 27, 29, 34, 50). But he clearly has a 
prima facie case, and so, although his accusers charge him with phonos hekousios (27, 
37-42, 47, 50), he is entitled to be tried not at the Areopagus (30), but at the 
Delphinion. 
 
The option chosen by Euphiletus was not for everyone: the speaker of Isaeus 8. 44 
describes his opponent as a serial seducer, undeterred by his experience when he 
‘underwent what it is right for those who do such things to undergo’ – whatever ὅ τι 
προσήκει is here, it is not death. Other passages refer to various indignities short of 
death.25 There is also a rule that someone who lost a suit for false imprisonment as a 
seducer (moichos) would be handed over for his opponent to do as he wished with 
him, short of using a knife.26 It is possible, perhaps even likely, that the killing of the 
seducer was unusual at the time of Lysias’ speech, perhaps even something that a 
defendant would have to work hard to present as justified. But however that may be, 
the provision to kill or humiliate a moichos betrays the same general intention as does, 
for example, the law against hybris (deliberate humiliation) – that the honour of 
citizens should be protected and that citizens who believe that their timê has been 
illegitimately violated have the support of the state in seeking redress. These 
provisions show not just that timê was something that a citizen could be seen as 
having a right to, but that the community set great store by the protection of such 
rights. It is not unconnected to this that timê is the ordinary Greek for the rights and 
privileges that citizens enjoyed, its opposite, atimia, the legal term for the forfeiture of 
(all or some of) such rights and privileges. The timê of the victim is also a central 
focus of homicide law: we see this in the law’s general orientation towards the victim, 
the victim’s family, and their demand for timôria, restitution of timê, and in the 
particular provision that there is no right to pursue timôria if the victim him- or 
herself remits the killer. We see it, incidentally, also in the provision that the 
intentional killing of a metic or slave be tried in the same court and accorded the same 
level of redress as the unintentional killing of a citizen:27 this is clearly a matter of the 
relative value of the different categories of victim; their difference in legal status – i.e. 
timê – is reflected in a difference in sanction – i.e. timôria.  
 
                                                
25 See Lys. 1. 49; Ar. Nub. 1083; Plut. 168; Xen. Mem.  2. 1. 5. 
26 See [D.] 59. 66. 
27 Ath. Pol. 57. 3. 
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This brings us to the central question: how should we describe the timôria that the 
state, under the terms of its laws concerning homicide, permits the victim’s relatives 
to pursue – is it vengeance, is it punishment, is it both, or is it neither? 
 
There are various modern distinctions between vengeance and punishment that have 
been used to map Athenian terms and practices onto either of the two poles of the 
antithesis.28 But both the modern definitions and their application to Athenian terms 
and practices can be problematic.29 The discussion of why this is so risks being 
lengthy and rather arid; but a particular problem, it seems to me, is that many attempts 
to define timôria in Athenian law in terms of some modern distinction between 
vengeance and punishment assume from the outset that timôria must be one or other 
of these.30 For the purposes of this chapter I want to start from a more basic idea, 
which I think is less controversial. I refer to the notion that, both conceptually and 
legally, punishment, however conceived, is primarily an experience of the offender, 
imposed on that person because they are believed to have committed – or, in a legal 
                                                
28 For typical modern formulations, see Mackenzie (1981) 5-17; Saunders (1991) 21-2 (with 21-32 in 
general on the application of such criteria in Adkins (1960) and Mackenzie (1980)); Allen (2000) 18-
19 (with 15-38 in general). For Mackenzie (1981: 10-12) ‘revenge is characterized as a transaction 
taking place between individuals’ (p. 11 n. 27), whereas punishment must be institutionalized, carried 
out in the name of an (impersonal and impartial) authority, and imposed on the offender as a penalty 
(rather than as the ‘price’ payable for the advantage of offending); victims have no authority to punish.  
29 See Allen (2000) 21: ‘Our intuitive distinction between “revenge” and “punishment” [that 
‘punishment is legitimate, but revenge is not’, p. 18] breaks down in the face of the [Athenian] record.’ 
Cf. ibid. n. 23: ‘The definitions of “revenge” and “punishment” do not even capture contemporary 
penal practices’ (or, one might add, contemporary English usage either, in which many forms of simple 
interpersonal retaliation can be described as ‘punishment’, and (for example) a busy schedule at work 
can, in the absence on an offence, an offender, and a punitive authority, be described as ‘punishing’). 
30 Thus Allen (see previous note) recognizes the inadequacy of the distinction between revenge and 
punishment, but then proceeds to use ‘punishment’ as the default category. The danger of equivocation 
that this entails is apparent when, in her discussion of Pindar’s fifth Nemean (2000: 100-1), she applies 
the term ‘punishment’ both to the retaliation of Acastus’ wife when Peleus spurns her sexual advances 
and to Acastus’ attempt to kill Peleus as a result of his wife’s false accusation of rape. Allen has 
insisted that Greek timôria resembles ‘punishment’ when it is used to enforce widely accepted social 
norms; but though it is a perfectly legitimate colloquial use of the English terminology to say that the 
wife of Acastus ‘wishes to punish’ Peleus (Allen (2000) 100), it is not a widely accepted social norm 
that a wife whose attempt to persuade a virtuous young man to have sex with her has failed is entitled 
to retaliate by plotting his death. There is an important distinction to be made here, and a role for the 
category of ‘revenge’ that is not being given its due. Cf. her p. 135: ‘Modern worries about vendetta 
are based on … anxiety about the valorization of anger. For that matter, we moderns generally expect 
that vendettas will arise when anger is made the basis for responses to wrongdoing. Where anger is a 
legitimate ground for punishing, one act of punishment will constantly lead to another since those who 
are punished will become angry at the loss of honor entailed in their own punishment and with then try 
to punish in turn.’ But if one act of punishment constantly leads to another it is moot whether we are 
talking about punishment at all – if one believes that one has been punished, then there is nothing for 
one ‘to punish in turn’. At the very least, Allen’s use of the relevant terms here is non-standard. For 
different reasons (i.e. because the timôria that Athenian litigants seek is pursued ‘in conformity with 
the laws of their state and through the medium of ... the proper agents of that state’s power and 
authority’), Herman too (2006: 190-1) insists that such timôria ‘has very little to do with “primitive” 
vengeance and a great deal to do with what we would call punishment’. A substantial section of 
Herman’s book is devoted to the alleged failure of scholars who engage in conceptual analysis of 
Greek social and ethical terminology to avoid the pitfall of ‘the fusion of moral norms’ (p. 158), i.e. 
imposing modern categories on ancient realities. Herman makes no attempt to analyse the concept of 
timôria by investigating its usage; yet there is a clear ‘fusion of moral norms’ in his insistence that in 
legal contexts timôria is not revenge, but punishment (and repeated inconsistency with the several 
passages in which he himself uses ‘revenge’ words to translate timôria words, e.g. pp. 191, 397). 
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context, because they have been convicted of – an offence. If we accept that, we can 
begin to look more closely at timôria in Athenian law. 
 
Greek has perfectly ordinary words, zêmia, kolasis, and their cognates, that denote the 
imposition of harm or loss upon an offender, and these occur with some frequency in 
forensic oratory, including homicide speeches. Over our six homicide speeches as a 
whole, however, zêmia/kolasis-words are much less frequent than timôria-words: the 
ratio is 20:56, i.e. timôria-words are almost three times as common. Table 1 gives the 
occurrences of relevant terms by speech, by purpose (defence or prosecution), and by 
procedure (dikê versus ‘public’ procedures).31 
 
defence prosecution 
 Ant. 5  Ant. 6 Lys. 1  total Ant. 1  Lys. 
12 
Lys. 
13 
total 
Timôria  6 6 6 18 7 6 25 38 
Orgê  5 0 2 7 0 7 0 7 
Kolasis  2 0 0 2 0 2 0 2 
Zêmia  1 2 7 10 0 2 4 6 
Totals 14 8 15 37 7 17 29 53 
 
‘private’ (dikê) ‘public’ (apagogê, euthynai) 
 Ant. 1  Ant. 6 Lys. 1  total Ant. 5  Lys. 
12 
Lys. 
13 
total 
Timôria  7 6 6 19 6 6 25 37 
Orgê  0 0 2 2 5 7 0 12 
Kolasis  0 0 0 0 2 2 0 4 
Zemia  0 2 7 9 1 2 4 7 
Totals 7 8 15 30 14 17 29 60 
 
Table 1 
 
The ratio of zemia/kolasis-words to timôria-words is slightly skewed by two speeches 
of Lysias, 1 and 13. Lysias 1 is a defence speech, but the argument is that that the 
defendant was in fact implementing a form of punishment demanded by the law, and 
the speaker’s tactic is to represent his victim, not himself as the offender. This is 
probably why this is the only homicide speech in which there are more instances of 
zêmia than of timôria (though timôria is also important). By contrast, Lysias 13 is a 
prosecution by the ‘public’ procedure of apagogê, in which it is an important part of 
the prosecutor’s strategy to arouse the dikasts’ indignation over the crimes of the 
Thirty Tyrants in general. This is one basic reason why the speaker returns repeatedly 
to the notion of timôria. But otherwise, given the comparatively small corpus and the 
limited occurrence of the relevant terms, there does not seem to be much that is 
statistically significant about the distribution, either in terms of defence versus 
prosecution speeches or in terms of dikê versus other procedures. One thing that does 
not appear in the Table, however, should be noted: the representation of the polis (as 
well as the victim) as a victim of the offence or of offender’s injustice (adikia) occurs 
                                                
31 The reason for the inclusion of ‘anger’ terms (orgê etc.) will become apparent below. 
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only twice in dikai (in Antiphon 1. 3 and 24), but is much more common in the 
‘public’ case, Lysias 13. We shall say more on these subjects below. 
 
Like zemia, kolasis, and ‘punishment’, timôria can be presented as an experience of 
the offender, one that he undergoes because of his offence.32 But much more regularly 
and characteristically , timôria is something that is performed for the victim 
(expressed using the dative of interest) or on behalf of the victim (using the 
preposition hyper + genitive).33 Indeed, the timôria that is achieved by a successful 
prosecution is said to be the victim’s timôria.34 It is something done to the offender, 
but also something extracted from the offender and given to the victim. Given the 
term’s etymology, this is exactly what one would expect: the reference to a victim’s 
loss of timê and the corresponding need to redress the balance by extracting timê from 
the offender are intrinsic. This reference to the interests of the victim is, for Aristotle, 
precisely what distinguishes timôria from kolasis.35 The orators are perfectly capable 
of making the same distinction, as when Demosthenes draws an implicit distinction 
between kolasis as the legal imposition of suffering on a convicted defender and the 
satisfaction of the prosecutor, allowed (as we saw above) merely to witness state-
imposed punishment.36 Since timôria is defined fundamentally by its reference to the 
interests of the victim, it is unlike our word ‘punishment’. But this does not mean that 
it is automatically to be regarded as vengeance: the same reference to the interests of 
the victim is apparent in English terms such as ‘redress’ and ‘justice’.37 We see this 
especially, and on a daily basis, in campaigns to secure ‘justice for so and so’; a 
Google search for the phrase ‘justice for Trayvon Martin’ yielded 32,400,000 hits on 
Sunday 26 January 2014 . It is important to emphasize that this is not just a matter of 
slotting in an English term – vengeance, punishment, redress, or justice – and seeing 
whether it fits the context as a translation of timôria (though this procedure is a 
frequent tactic in the revenge versus punishment controversy). It is rather that the 
reflexivity of timôria as a concept marks it out as significantly different from 
‘punishment’ but, at least in some respects, analogous to ‘justice’, in the sense of the 
just redress that victims or their partisans seek for the wrong that they have suffered. 
The fact that (for example) the family of a murder victim in the contemporary United 
States can demand ‘justice for Trayvon’ indicates the interest that victims, their 
families, and their supporters are felt to have in the legitimate punishment of the 
offender. Such demands tend to be voiced in the context of campaigns driven 
fundamentally by family and other supporters; the hitherto impartial may join such 
campaigns, but when they do, they are no longer impartial, but emotionally involved 
to a considerable extent. The ‘justice’ that is the focus of such campaigns is not 
abstract and impartial, but something that is sought as a way of satisfying both the 
rights and interests of the deceased and the emotional needs of that person’s family 
                                                
32 Ant. 1. 27 (offender receives timôria); 5. 93 (timôria for offences, genitive); Lys. 12. 70 (timôria 
extracted from the offender). 
33 For the victim (dative of interest): Ant. 1. 3, 24; 5. 79, 88; on behalf of the victim, hyper + genitive: 
Ant. 5. 95; 6. 6; Lys. 1. 47; 12. 94, 100; 13. 1, 41, 42, 74-5. 
34 Ant. 1. 5 (using the  possessive genitive); cf. 1. 21 (timôria given to the victim). 
35 See Rhetoric 1369b12-14: ‘there is a difference between timôria and kolasis; the latter is inflicted in 
the interest of the sufferer, the former in the interest of him who inflicts it, that he may obtain 
satisfaction (ἵνα πληρωθῇ)’.  
36 D. 23. 69: though the victim may witness the imposition of the penalty, ‘only the laws and the 
appointed officers have power over the man for punishment (kolasai)’. 
37 Todd (2007: 90) chooses ‘redress’ as a translation precisely because of the inadequacy of both 
‘punishment’ and ‘revenge’, but does not go into detail. 
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and supporters. My point is not that ‘justice’ and timôria are interchangeable lexical 
tokens, but that the victim’s demand for justice in contemporary English answers to 
something that may also play a role in the pursuit of timôria for the victim in classical 
Athens. The reflexive nature of the term does not in itself impose an interpretation in 
terms of what we call revenge. 
 
It is true, however, that timôria in legal contexts, including homicide, is not 
qualitatively different from timôria in purely interpersonal contexts. Both the victim 
of an insulting joke and the victim of homicide can be said to want timôria. (Again, 
we have terms with a similar range: in the former case, offence is taken; in the latter, 
the offence that is committed is a breach of the law.) The basic scenario would be the 
same whether the timôria sought or extracted was pursued through the courts or 
through revenge killing: timôria is something that the deceased is felt fervently to 
want and that is laid upon his/her relatives as a duty: the scenarios envisaged in our 
sources, where the victims, before they die, lay this duty upon their families,38 would 
sit just as well in contexts of extra-legal redress as they do in contexts of legal redress.  
 
A good illustration of the continuity between legal and extra-legal uses of timôria is 
given by a passage in Demosthenes 47. A man called Theophemus, together with his 
relatives Euergus and Mnesibulus, who are the speaker’s opponents in the present 
case, allegedly burst into the speaker’s house and, in the attempt to seize his property, 
caused the death of an elderly woman, the speaker’s former nurse, an ex-slave freed 
by the speaker’s father. The speaker tells how he sought the advice of the exêgetai (a 
body of religious experts) on what to do; they advise him not to prosecute 
Theophemus for homicide, since the dead woman was neither his relative nor his 
slave, but simply to purify his household and ‘obtain timôria in some other way, if 
you wish’.39 The speaker’s household has been violated; and he is clearly engaged in 
an ongoing dispute with Theophemus and his family; but the specific question was 
about prosecution for homicide; such a prosecution would have been a form of 
timôria for an unlawful killing, but timôria for the old nurse’s death can also be 
achieved in other ways, a phrase that is perhaps vague enough to encompass forms of 
timôria that do not depend on any form of legal process at all. Though timôria for 
homicide is normally pursued only via homicide trials, such trials satisfy a need that 
remains to be satisfied when a homicide trial is impossible, a need that could in theory 
be satisfied by other means. 
 
At the same time, the usage of timôria-words themselves also shows us that there is 
more to timôria in homicide cases than the simple pursuit of personal vengeance 
through the courts. This is because this usage also indicates very clearly the ways in 
which the process of satisfying the victim’s claim to redress is also one that directly 
affects the community and its laws. First, there are various ways in which speakers 
                                                
38 See e.g. Ant. 1. 29 (‘if they are able and have time before they die, they summon their friends and 
relatives, call them to witness, tell them who the murderers are, and charge them to timôrêsai for the 
wrong’, ἐπισκήπτουσι τιμωρῆσαι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἠδικημένοις);  Lys. 13. 41-2 (‘Dionysodorus … 
referred to this man Agoratus as responsible for his death, and charged me and Dionysius, his brother 
here, and all his friends to timôrein Agoratus on his behalf; and he charged his wife, believing her to be 
with child by him, that if she should bear a son she should tell the child that Agoratus had taken his 
father's life, and should bid him timôrein Agoratus on his behalf as his killer’). Note that what the 
victim in Ant. 1. 29 is explicitly said to want is timôria for the injustice he has suffered. 
39 D. 47. 70: ἄλλῃ δὲ εἴ πῃ βούλει, τιμωροῦ. 
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implicate the community, as represented by the dikasts, in the timôria sought by 
victims and prosecutors. In Lysias 1. 47, for example, Euphiletus (the defendant who 
argues that his killing of Eratosthenes was lawful) argues that his timôria serves not 
only his own private interest, but also the interests of the whole city, on the grounds 
that other citizens are less likely to become victims of moicheia (the seduction of 
one’s wife) if the present jury endorses the measures that Euphiletus has taken.40 
Several passages in Lysias 13 present the victims of homicide as philoi and 
benefactors of the polis who are thus reciprocally entitled to the dikasts’ support in 
obtaining the redress they deserve.41 Other passages simply observe that the victim’s 
right to redress is guaranteed by law.42 More fundamentally, however, the community 
or its laws can themselves be presented as ‘victims’ with an interest in securing 
timôria from a perpetrator for an offence against the city itself. As we noted above, 
this is more common in the prosecution speeches delivered in the context of the 
‘public’ procedures of euthynai and apagôgê (Lysias 12 and 13), but it also occurs in 
Antiphon 1, for the prosecution in a dikê phonou.43 
 
There is in fact no real gulf between the pursuit of timôria for the victim and pursuit 
of timôria for the city or its laws. Both prosecutors and defendants frequently spell 
out that timôria rectifies injustice.44 This is a regular feature of the usage of the term 
in Greek.45 Adikia and adikein, of course, can be used of purely interpersonal wrongs 
in Greek,46 which reminds us that notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, 
justified or unjustified retribution are implicated in everyday social interaction as well 
as in law and litigation. Even purely personal, extra-legal timôria can rest on the idea 
that people have a right to respect and a right to redress when that right is violated. 
Yet, be that as it may, the timôria that is pursued via the courts is not a matter of 
purely interpersonal relations. To seek timôria through the courts implies that the 
accused has broken at least one of the city’s laws. Such timôria must be presented as 
something that is sought from the offender, rather than from third parties who may be 
                                                
40 Cf. his opening gambit in presenting his killing of Eratosthenes as the imposition of a lawful penalty 
(zêmia) in 1. 1:  ‘I should set great store, gentlemen, on your judging this matter in the same way as 
you would if it had happened to you. For I know that, if you had the same opinion about others as 
about yourselves, every one of you would be angry [aganaktein] at what has been done; indeed, you 
would all consider the penalties for those do such things to be too lenient.’  
41 Lys. 13. 1-2, 92-4, 97. 
42 See Ant. 1. 21 (legal process enables the timôria to which the victim is entitled, axios, on account of 
the adikia he has suffered; dikasts as well as prosecutors are agents of timôria); Lys. 1. 2, 5, 31 
(victim’s rights guaranteed by law). 
43 See Ant. 1. 3 (timôria for both the laws and the victim: τιμωρῆσαι πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς 
ὑμετέροις … δεύτερον δ᾽ ἐκείνῳ τῷ τεθνηκότι), 24 (‘I am prosecuting to ensure that she pays for 
her crime and to obtain timôria for our father and your laws (τιμωρήσω τῷ τε πατρὶ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ καὶ 
τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς ὑμετέροις); in this you should support me one and all, if what I say is true’); Lys. 12. 
94 (the dikasts as dêmos in its judicial capacity are urged to seek timôria on their own behalf); 13. 48 
(remember what the Thirty did to you as individuals and to the city in general, and extract timôria), 51 
(the rejected notion that the Thirty, in putting their victims to death, were pursuing timôria on behalf of 
the polis), 76 (timôria against Agoratus for his offences against the city), 78 (timôria for those who 
wronged the dêmos), 95 (remember what the Thirty did to you as individuals and to the polis and 
impose timôria). 
44 For timôria for adikia against the polis, see Lys. 13. 2 -3, 78, 82-4; for adikia against the victim: Ant. 
1. 21, 27, 29; 5. 79-80, 88; 6. 6-7; Lys 1. 2, 39. 
45 See e.g. Hdt. 2. 120. 5: The Trojan war shows ‘how great acts of injustice attract great timôriai from 
the gods’ (ὡς τῶν μεγάλων ἀδικημάτων μεγάλαι εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμωρίαι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν). 
46 See e.g. Hipponax 115. 15 W; Sappho 1. 19-20 L-P; Theognis 1283. Cf. Pearson (1962) 17 and 
passim. 
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associated with the offender. In this way, the legal context gives timôria a particular 
legal shape. Passages in which timôria is sought for the city and its laws because the 
offender has wronged the state bring out what is implicit in any case where a citizen 
seeks redress, through the courts, for the unjust and illegal violation of his right to 
honour; the city, via its laws, guarantees the rights, that is, the timê, of individual 
citizens; to violate those rights is to dishonour both the individual and the state which 
guarantees the individual’s claim to honour.  
 
At the same time, we need to note that at all these levels, timôria retains its 
fundamental association with anger – with the anger that one feels when one’s own 
timê is attacked, when one’s family’s timê is attacked, when one witnesses as a 
bystander an illegitimate attack on the timê of others, or when one feels, as a member 
of the community, that the timê of one’s community is under attack. The relevant 
reactive attitudes remain emotional at all levels from personal affront to violation of 
the laws that bind all equally and without partiality.47 
 
Athenian legal discourse is built up out of ordinary social, ethical, and emotional 
language; that language is not transformed by its use in legal contexts, but still its use 
in such contexts gives it a distinctively legal shape.48 The honour that is enjoyed by all 
Athenian citizens alike, by virtue of their membership of the community of citizens – 
the same honour that the state protects by giving individuals the right to seek timôria 
through the courts – is not something entirely different from the honour that is at 
stake in purely personal interactions; but it is not merely that either. It is also 
something in which the state as such has a legitimate interest, both as guarantor of 
citizens’ honour and as a bearer of honour in its own right. The use of timôria in 
homicide speeches reflects the importance of timê in the concept of citizen rights, 
rights that the state guarantees by granting the right of redress through the system of 
justice under the rule of law. Timôria resembles our concept of punishment in some 
ways, but diverges from it in many interesting ways. But the fact that it is not quite 
co-extensive with our notion of punishment does not mean that it is merely a concept 
of revenge; tertium indeed datur. We need to understand Athenian concepts, in their 
own terms, in their original Athenian contexts. The usage of timôria in homicide 
speeches points to a specifically Athenian way of seeing things, in which a citizen’s 
‘value’ encompasses not only interpersonal forms of dignity and respect, but also his 
legal status as a member of a group of citizens, each of whom enjoys the same timê 
and whose claim to timê is guaranteed by law and by the sanctions that his fellow 
citizens are willing to impose – or to let him impose – if his timê is violated. To claim 
that if timôria is not punishment, it must be revenge, is simply the fallacy of false 
alternatives.  The antithesis between vengeance and punishment is another of the 
many modern dualisms that proves unhelpful in trying to understand Athenian values 
in their own terms.  
 
Works cited 
Allen, D. (2000), The World of Prometheus: The Politics of Punishing in Democratic Athens 
(Princeton). 
                                                
47 On the relation and interaction between those ‘reactive attitudes’ which express our ethical attitudes 
towards others (e.g. indignation, sympathy) and those which express and assert our concern for 
ourselves (e.g. anger, grief), see Strawson (1962). On the role of anger in Athenian litigation, see Allen 
(2000); Rubinstein (2004). 
48 Cf. Johnstone (1999), esp. 126-7. 
 14 
Carawan, E. (1998), Rhetoric and the Law of Draco (Oxford). 
Cohen, D. (1995), Law, Violence, and Community in Classical Athens (Cambridge). 
Cohen, D. (2005), ‘Crime, Punishment, and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens’, in M. Gagarin and D. 
Cohen (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law (Cambridge), 211-35. 
Dover, K. J. (1974), Greek Popular Morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford). 
Gagarin, M. (1981), Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law (Berkeley and LA). 
Heitsch, E. (1984), Aidesis im attischen Strafrecht (Abh. Mainz 1984.1, Wiesbaden). 
Herman, G. (2006), Morality and Behaviour in Democratic Athens: A Social History (Cambridge). 
Johnstone, S. (1999), Disputes and Democracy: The Consequences of Litigation in Ancient Athens 
(Austin). 
Lanni, A. (2006), Law and Justice in the Courts of Classical Athens (Cambridge). 
MacDowell, D. M. (1963), Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators (Manchester). 
MacDowell, D. M. (1968), ‘Unintentional Homicide in the Hippolytus’, RM 111, 156-8. 
MacDowell, D. M. (1990), Demosthenes against Meidias (Oration 21) (Oxford). 
Mackenzie, M. M. (1981), Plato on Punishment (Berkeley and Los Angeles). 
Pearson, L. (1962), Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece (Stanford). 
Rhodes, P. J. (1998), ‘Enmity in Fourth-Century Athens’, in  P. Cartledge, P. Millett, and S. von Reden 
(eds), Kosmos: Essays in Order, Conflict, and Community in Classical Athens (Cambridge), 
144-61. 
Rubinstein, L. (2004), ‘Stirring up Dikastic Anger’, in D. L. Cairns and R. A. Knox (eds), Law, 
Rhetoric and Comedy in Classical Athens: Essays in honour of Douglas M. MacDowell 
(Swansea), 187-203. 
Saunders, T. J. (1991), Plato’s Penal Code: Tradition, Controversy, and Reform in Greek Penology 
(Oxford). 
Strawson, P. F. (1962), ‘Freedom and Resentment’, PBA 48, 1-25. Reprinted in Freedom and 
Resentment and Other Essays (London, 1974). 
Todd, S. (1993), The Shape of Athenian Law (Oxford). 
Todd. S. (2000), ‘How to Execute People in Classical Athens’, in V. Hunter and J. Edmondson (eds), 
Law and Status in Classical Athens (Oxford), 31-52. 
Todd, S. (2007), A Commentary on Lysias: Speeches 1-11 (Oxford). 
